The philosophy of B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll

Tweedledee, it may be remembered,[4] remarked that certain identities "are" logic. Now, there is some doubt as to whether he, like Jevons,[5] unders

may have been indicated by Tweedledee's frequent use of the word "contrariwise" that he did not follow the majority of logi

serve different purposes,[10] and his proclivity towards riddles seem to make out a good case for those who hold that he was in fact a Hegelian. Indeed, riddles are very closely allied to puns, and it was upon a pun, consisting of the confusion of the "is" of predication with the "is" of identity-so that, for example, "Socrates" was identified with "mortal" an

at achievement of late years has been to prove the consistency of the principles of arithmetic, a science which is unreservedly accepted except by some empiricists,[14] it can be proved formally that one foundation of arithmetic is shattered.[15] It is true that, quite lately, it has been shown that this conclusion may be avoi

alternatives: if we chose principles in accordance with common-sense, we arrived at conclusions which shocked common-sense; by starting with para

ught; and, in the second place, people think that the "Laws" have something to do with holding for the operations of their minds, just as laws of nature hold for events in the world around us.[17] But that the

othing to do with mind is given by the phrase "it is morally certain that such-and-such a proposition is true." Now, in the first place, morality, curiously enough, seems to be closely associated with mental acts: we have professorships and lectureships of, and examinations in, "mental and moral philosophy." In the

t, throughout all logic and mathematics, the existence of the human or any other mind is totally irrelevant; mental processes are studied by means of logic, but the subject-matter of logic does not presuppose mental processes, and would be equally true if there were n

Ph. L., pp. 1

er, A. d.

strates the importance attached to the Prin

o. S.,

. L., i.

one, E. L. L., pp. 183, 191. "Contrariwise," it may

pp. 173-5, 324-5;

el and the Metaphysics of the Fluxional Calculus," Tr

ee App

lished about three years after the death of Mr. R*ss*ll, and entitled Our Knowledge of the

h. L., pp.

R. M. M., Marc

and his lack of comprehension of pure mathematics, may be taken (see Appendix C). In his (correct)

rege, Gg.,

ee App

rege, Gg.,

ve references an

sell, H. J., Ju