rget that accura
s form the only s
ce.-P
f moment that he takes true and not false guides. A writer in the 'Monthly Repository' observes, that 'the basis of all knowledge is such an extensive induction from particular facts, as leads to general conclusions and fundamental axioms'-and if the facts are erroneous, evidently the conclusions will be also erroneous. He also remarks, that 'in reasoning, all
ed to be right. Conscience and conscientiousness are often confounded. We say, lawyers have no conscience, we mean no conscientiousness. They know right from wrong as men, but not professionally. It is with consciousness that the logician has to deal.
principles o
tion of our o
e in the evidenc
r mental o
ur mental
rmity of the oper
ent-the events of history and the theorems of mathematics. But the truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others axe inferred. Our assent to the
tally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for the purpose of establishing such truths; no rules
the higher or transcendental metaphysics, but all the facts that compose evidence and become the
gest evidence of our existence. It cannot be proved so forcibly by any other means; and although Des Cartes' language may appear to involve
: Logic, vo
Robert
ept what arises from our experience and consciousness-depends on it. In the administration of justice it is the sole guardian of property and life. If a man of known integrity and veracity state a fact, without any possible motive of self-interest, and evidently subject to no delusion; and if others of
ubjects are capable of more accurate observation than others. 2. On the powers and character of the observer-his ability to understand or note that of
certainty is characterised as a probability. Great, very great may be the probability, still it is less in reliableness than a physical
e strictness of mathematical proof, insist upon the same accuracy in moral investigations. I have elsewhere pointed out the juvenility and infatuation of this error. Insist upon demonstration where the nature of the questions admits it. Less should not, in such case, suffice. Accept probability where probability is the sole evidence attainable. Never ask more than reason can grant. We must admit gradations of validity. What we are conscious of, we know. All we receive on testimony, we believe.
ssays, vol
to make them probable in the lowest degree-not to decide them as positively true. Th
act or upon too few to make
weight from a moral certainty, where it ranks next to a physical certainty, dow
ree of conviction they ought to produce. It is easy to form plausible arguments; but to form such as can stand the test of time, is not always easy. I could amuse the reader with numerous examples of conjectural argu
and the chances of conclusiveness may seem remote-yet ultimate results are not to be despaired of: the new comparison of conjectures and the arrangement of facts daily throws new light on age-contested points. Sy
found which sets bounds between the enlightened and the dark part of things-between what is and what is not comprehensible by us. But this will only be when the untried has been universally attempted in all directions. Bailey, I think, has defined truth as being that which is universally accepted after having been universally examined. Little of ters. It is our opinion that these things are true, although we may never have visited Palmyra or Thebes, nor made the calculations of the algebraist, nor the observations of the astronomer. In these cases our belief is founded on our experience and knowledge of mankind. It is quite true that travellers exaggerate, and scientific men are sometimes mistaken; but we know that
what you assert be true, prove it to be so; if it be not, you labour in vain to induce belief. All the authority in the wor
For several days after, he was observed to be measuring the growth of a blade of grass. When asked the meaning of this, he replied, "The fourth commandment says, 'Six days shalt thou labour, but the seve
riginal sin; an adventure from which they contracted such an invincible propensity to cheating, that they are now continually lying in wait to deceive us. But there is in man, it se
ter x
de Educat
on Truth
orate. When Euler remarked of his new law of arches, 'This will be found true, though contrary to all experience'-when Gall exclaimed of his new philosophy of the sensorium, 'This is true, though opposed to the philosophy of ages'-they expr
selves. The truest standards of certainty arise from individuality of retrospection.
iety, though the generous would be incited to noble deeds, the sordid would lay their vulture claws on the world, and the unprincipled victimise their fellows. You have, therefore, to say, 'Man, do what thou listest, provided it be compatible with the welfare of th
tribute of innocence and courage. He loves Fraternity-it knits society together in brotherhood. These are standards. His codes of life and judgment arise from these aspirations. That which accords with these principles is reasonable. Whatev
, called mental facts. There is no chance of identifying these without the power of self-analysis, which is one reason why metaphysic ability belongs to so few, and why questions involving metaphysical co
of others. But this must not mislead us as to the number, and overwhelm us with a sense of complexity, where in fact simplicity reigns. Those who have the power of self-analysis make for themselves rules of conduct, and the best are originated in this way-for when a man recasts his acquirements of sense and education, in order
hat he was w
thought as
principle
t his mo
Rob, 'What n
statutes and
s up agains
, against
passion, m
o guide us
e law itse
erness
, blinded,
that are pl
I graven
ls me wh
monitor,' said Waverley to Flora. 'A better one by far Mr. Waverley will always f
hath been
death, sinc
the simple
heart of m
books, entitled 'How to Observe.' This quality is the distinction between the natural and artificial man-the natural man observes what is in nature-the artificial notes what he finds in books-the one depends on himself-the other
op at everything to question its nature, at every word to ask its import. It was the aim of Pestalozzi to cultivate by his system of tuition this incessant questioni
half of what he sees; another sets down much more than he sees, confounding it with what he imagines, or with what he infers $ another takes note of the kind of all the circumstances, but being inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the quantity of each vague and uncertain; another sees indeed t
vol. 1,
ght grey colour. Then, as to the form of the monument, the first witness said it was oblong; the next said it was square at the top, and came down narrower to the bottom, and there rested on a single truss; the third witness described it as being square at the bottom, testing upon two trusses; and went up narrower and narrower to a point at the top; the fourth witness said it was angular at the top; the next said it was square at the bottom, was brought to a point in the middle, and was then curved into a sort of festoon; the sixth witness stated that it was square at the top and
, May 1
vation-and this case farther admonishes us that if such differences may exist as to a question of fact, where the senses are the
he painter sees traits of character of light and shade in an object which the untaught limner never
ation we can increase natura
y conscious of, than the distance of an object from us. Yet it has long been ascertained, that what is perceived by the eye, is at most nothing more than a va
rst determine the sources whence the facts are to be collected.
rights are:- 1