ONS. AND THE SPEECHES BY

itall An

the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of Whither, Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although unstudied men, doe not conc

te; Desire; Hunge

words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the Latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are orme and aphorme. For nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for

ire, and Love, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the object; by Love, most c

;) and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all,

nt

immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from tha

e that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same Appetites, and aversion

d E

ll, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the

htfull Profitable; Un

we say in some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and evill. So that of Good there be three k

t Disp

Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but Moti

ure O

Vitall motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not improperly called Jucunda, (A J

the apparence, or sense of evill. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with

Pleasures Of The M

s and Exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, Or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or D

first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondl

th an opinion of atta

e, without such o

h opinion of Hurt fr

hope of avoyding that Hu

dden Cour

ant Hope, CONFIDE

nt Despayre, DIFFI

e to another, when we conceive the sa

her, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARIT

cause men contending for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire

e, AMBITION: a name used also in the wor

ut a little to our ends; And fear of things th

of little helps, and h

danger of Death, or Wo

imity in the use o

same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLENESSE; or

of Persons for s

ersons for Pleasing the

ed from Rumination, that is Imag

th desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. T

rt to another, to make him condemn s

singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a

mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, super

f them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by ex

lty, ADMIRATION; proper to man, because it

of his own former actions, is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it, is calle

inion of want of power, is

s, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Historie

y comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfection

ey are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are Women, and Children. Therefore, some Weep for the loss of Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop ma

BLUSHING; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a signe of the love of

pt of good reputation

re is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving from great wickedn

LTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasur

d, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him,

or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; some

because men know, or think such Deliberation vaine. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain.

Hopes and Feares is no less in other living Creatur

, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee retain th

e

Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, Is The Last Appetite In Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverth

ition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginni

Speech,

e Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words, but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as, Do This, Forbear That; which when the party is obliged

because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not. The best signes of Passions pre

d Evill

ences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that which Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the e

li

uch thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity

Magni

reatness of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called Mak