accordance with the noble essence of his soul; and, as if of herself, nature will become open to him. Moral act

Nov

t for their investigation, was shown to imply that the lowest forms of existence can be explained, only as stages in the self-realization of that which is highest. This idea "levels upwards," and points to self-consciousness as

best expression for that highest principle, which is conceived as the truth of being, and whether Browning's treatment of it is consistent and valid, I do not as yet inquire. Before attempting that task, it must be seen to what extent, and in what way, he applies the hypothesis of universal love to the particular facts of life. For the present, I take it as admitted that the hypothesis is legitimate, as an hypothesis; i

e. He knew that he had brought upon himself the hard task of showing that pain, weakness, ignorance, failure, doubt, death, misery, and vice, in all their complex forms, can find their legitimate place in a scheme of love. And there is nothing more

he gloom which reflection gathers around the general problem. Art cannot answer the questions of philosophy. The difficulties that critical reason raises reason alone can lay. Nevertheless, the poet was forced by his reflective impulse, to meet that problem in the form in which it presents itself in the region of metaphysics. He was conscious of the presuppositi

hat it rules all the rest. The superstructure of philosophic edifices is usually put together in a sufficiently solid manner-it is the foundation that gives way. Hence Hegel, who, whatever may be thought of his own theory, was certainly the most profound critic of phil

ate" love. And that love, we have shown, is conceived by him as the supreme moral motive, the u

Leben ist

ebens Leb

a loving purpose. To him there is no supreme good, except good character; and the foundation of that

h but ca

the soul that strive

h, unless the f

, stored up and g

e mode whereby s

life. Death read

itself conquered fr

ng soul, all worth

e at the

life, in its essence, is movement to moral goodness through opposition. His fundamental conception of th

se of knowledge

ves, which is

t himself by h

th in th

fession stra

ce, a thing no

hat he can kno

d who knows a

asts which kno

's limit, per

hat they know,

s partly but c

n from fancie

triving, this

d he may gr

man's distinct

t the beasts': G

and wholly h

I

the point of contradiction between the actual and ideal, and moving from the latter to the former. Strife constitutes him. He is a war of elements; "hurled from change to cha

pass from

real, from mi

med good, to what

th in th

between the actual and ideal reconciled, man woul

very instinc

life, joy, impul

I

g as he is

ast off, somew

nstance, it be asked whether man is rational or irrational, free or bound, good or evil, God or brute, the true answer, if he is veritably a being moving from ignorance to knowledge, from wickedness to virtue, from bondage to freedom, is, that he is at once neither of these alternatives and both. All hard terms of division, when applied to a subject which grows, are untrue. If the life of man is a self-enriching process, if he is becoming good, and rational, and free, then at no point in the movement is it possible to pass fixed and definite judgments upon him. He mu

unfaithful to the subject of their inquiry. They are treating a developing reality from an abstract point of view, and taking for granted,-what cannot be true of man, if he grows in intellectual power and moral goodness-that he is either good or evil, either rational o

tter way

faction that

way before Life

ncluding

rd de L

he old disputations of ethics meaningless, it is certain th

were

still therein,

mbiguous Pres

-reconcilin

I

, is the meaning both of the self and of the world it works upon. "We are here to learn t

conceived by Browning as a moral life, and not a more refined and complex form of the natural life of plants and animals-a view which finds its exponents in Herbert Spencer, and other so-called evolutionists-it is scarcely necessary to assert. It is a life which determines itself, and determines itself according to an idea of goodness. That idea, moreover, because it is a moral ideal, must be regarded as the conception of perfect and absolute goodness. Through the moral end, man is ideally identified with God, who, indeed, is necessarily conceived as man's moral ideal regarded as already and eternally real. "God" and the "moral ideal" ar

ood of life bu

ood, is some shad

gives it worth.

t yourself one

only love, and

a Ba

truth, that is, to constitute love into the inmost law of his being, and permanent

ng to d

amount of gain

ising wi

its own mere promise into fruition and fact. Through love man's nature reaches down to the permanent essence, amid the fleeting phenomena of the world, and is at one with what is first and last. As loving he ranks with God. No words are too strong to represent the intimacy of the relation. For, however limited in range and tainted with alien qualities human love may be, it is

lists between divinity and dust; the absolute dualism of the old ascetics between flesh and spirit, sense and reason, find their accurate parallel in Browning's teachings. But he is himself no ascetic, and the line of distinction he draws does not, like theirs, pass between the flesh and the spirit. It rather cleaves man's spiritual nature into two portions, which are absolutely different from each other. A chasm divides the head from the heart, the intellect from the emotions, the moral and practical from the perceptive and reflective faculties. And it is this absolute cleavage that gives to Browning's teaching, both on ethics and religion, one of its most peculiar characteristics. By keeping it constantly in sight, we may hope to render intellig

ledge

ed assuran

is somehow st

lar at S

he nature of fact, and we must "distrust it, even when it seems demonstrable." No professed agnostic can condemn the human intellect more utterly than he does. He pushes the limitedness of hum

of, thi

s sum of fa

on earth's le

t is, what ma

nswe

Bean-

ts objects, and throws its own shadow upon them; nor can it penetrate through that shado

gs, and Asolando-in all his later and more reflective poems, in fact. It must, I think, be held to be his deliberate and fi

stipulating, "Provided answer suits my hopes, not fears," gives a tolerably full account of that which must be regarded as the

Within that narrow space, of the self hemmed in by two unknowns, all experience is crammed. Out of

ture ma

his comes only-thing

without me and above

know not-ignorance

at I am, and, since

d pleasure: this is s

re not, what may pleas

experience-that is kn

a Sa

he consciousness that he is, but not what he is: the consciousness that he is pleased or pained by things about him, whose real natur

f

beginning, operati

ed by it

a Sa

inking thing" has, apparently, no elements in common with the "thinking things" of other selves. He ignores the fact that there may be general laws of thought, according to which his mind must act in order to be a mind. Intelligence

ide its n

and welcome! Pleasure

self? Why, here's my n

appearance: 'green a

radicts me: which empl

I

s own particular kind of senses and reason, gets his own particular experience, and draws his own particular conclusions from it. If it be asked whether these conclusions are true or not, the only answer is that the que

adventure earth bec

ore tally in our sense

a Sa

nough seen by the poet. He is well aware that his convictions rega

r myself

e spokesman for my bro

I

ment's me and mine," is too narrow a basis for any universal or objective

f-seems ordere

reigns outside

ncis F

pinion, nor, from the good and evil that app

its contriver, shown

ood or ev

a Sa

rance. A theory that it is ruled by the "prince of the power of the air" has just as much, and

e s

e knowledge-do i

d wise-working,

nd thee lies

y circumsc

ncis F

ld, and ourselves is matched by a sim

verwraps his

ut, relaxing,

more than lets

owledge-' Ignor

I

too, and the apparent choice between them to which man is continually constrained, may be mere

ar the sorrows-neithe

nce simply: 'tis next li

a Sa

l knowledge and the faculty of knowledge, condemns itself. If nothing is true, or if nothing is known, then this theory itself is not true, or its truth cannot be known. And if this theory is true, then nothing is true; for this theory, like all others, is the product of a defective intelligence. In whatsoever way the matter is put, there is left no standing-ground for the human critic who condemns human thought. And he cannot well pretend to

d it as equivalent to the common doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, which, in some form or other, all the schools of philosophy adopt. But the main reason will be found to lie in the fact that knowledge was not, to Browning, its own criterion or end. The primary fact of his philosophy is

tanding-

lter, whence al

ge they break a

ncis F

ctical

t thy knowledge

ove allied

thy truth a

lar of S

ct of the progressive moral life of man. For the fundamental presupposition which a man makes, is necessari

knowledge would, he contends, lift man above the need and the possibility of making the moral choice, which is our supreme business on earth. Man

," amongst the concessions it demands from "Reason," claims that man should know-not merely surm

l that man

alculable, every m

r that next life which

a Sa

ight and wrong, which the demand implies. The "promulgation of this decree," by Fancy, "makes both good and evil to cease." Prior

, with Nature's simple

en or hell depends up

ends the straight or

eet point or with or

ood nor evil does man

Saisia

eward to action in a necessary manner, and is known so to bind them, would "obtain prompt and absolute obedience." There are some "edicts, now styled God's own nature's," "which to hear

ve now, regularly

ion, straight law's bre

I

e necessity seen in the natural sphere. Since, therefore, man is made to grow, and earth is the place wherein he is to pass probation and prove his powers, there must remain a certain doubt as to the issues of his actions; c

isbel

at edict which for tru

a Sa

may elude the consequences of his wickedness,

Cloots, I ken

rdie's ranti

hour will se

r blac

e'll turn a c

eat yo

xception. There will be a special method of dealing with him. He is a "chosen sample"; and "God will think twice before He damns a man of his quality." It is just because there is such doubt as to the universality and necessity of the law

e is one of the strongest arguments for pessimism. To persons pledged to the support of no theory, and to those who have the na?veté, so hard to maintain side by side with strong doctrinal convictions, it seems amongst the worst of evils that man

s false

ss which fei

at's white, and d

rest upon th

lance? Soul-too

act-wants fict

alsehood: truth

Bean-

oth real and beautiful, and so well worth knowing. Yet, it is this very failure of knowledge-a failure which, be it remembered, is complete and absolute, because

ion of a loving will, then doubt, ignorance, and every other form of apparent evil would be fully justified-provided they were conditions whereby this highest good is attained. And, to Browning, ignorance was one of the conditions. And conseque

not rather imply the impossibility of a moral life. I return to the question asked at the beginning of this chapter, and which it is now possible

e facts which threaten his hypothesis. He reduces them into phenomena, in the sens

least is clear

s Man posses

st so much as s

gnorance on

ncis F

phenomena of his

and my s

bod

side are fact or feigning." And he h

ea

nd what evil,-

or be fact t

I

d, that constitutes the world a probation-place. It is a kind of moral gymnasium, crowded with phantoms, wherein by exercise man makes mo

e and suffered, loved an

onciling wisdom with

hant evil, power wit

remember! though none

assuming earth to

their chances, changes

for

a Sa

ecret, and know its phenomena as veritably either good or evil. There is the need of play

nd ther

imes, the arti

out, extern

be suspected,

cheat-but half

Bean-

a scheme of universal good, so that "white would rule unchecked along the line." Bu

onstan

shine,-the trem

seems my fait

I

o the actual presence of the incandescent white of love, which glows, as hope tells

hi

lain, be some

usion-evil

sed,-why, out w

from me. Type

ay, as shine nee

how were pit

by pa

ncis F

o each other, and each is kn

or

ech you!) Knowl

owledge of go

il

I

lar manner, clear knowledge that evil is illusion and that all things have their place

vident

masks pleasu

h of the finger

wning

I

s. He must take his stand on the contradiction. Hope he may have that all things work together for good. It is right that he should nourish the faith that the antagonism of evil with good in the world is only an illusion; but that faith must stop short of the complete conviction that knowledge would bring. When, therefore, the hypothesis of universal love is confronted with the evils of life, and we ask how it c

-but to li

the lump,

te through k

eless Powe

tand, ho

erie-A

answers: "Not so! I appeal from the intellect, which is detected as incompetent, to the higher court of the moral consciousness. And ther

ls were

owledge,-off, al

shed by better

ved more constan

loss to-morro

e golden?-lacq

st it! Not as

we learn

n the process:

ed assuran

is somehow st

victory, the

! Be rewarded

t's mer

lar at S

He is tolerably consistent in asserting that we know our own emotions and the phenomena of our own consciousness; but he is not consistent in his account of our knowledge, or ignorance, of external things. On the whole, he asserts that we know nothing of them. But in Asolando he seems to imply that the evidence of a loveless power in the world, permitting evil, is irresistible

ssage jus

om birth

ooking back on

rward to that

ld power o

Bean-

e facts in reaction against which his moral nature becomes active. What proof is there, then, that the universal love is

ange, av

ast, banis

erie-A

zes everywhere around him, merely maintains the world in its remorseless course, and

n,'-groa

of God's fin

right should

rong! How helpf

instance when

surely and

ssion and its

sin for once,

eam that justice

whereto its shar

rd de Ma

t there is no answer vouchsafed to man'

eals al

rs the har

s ea

erie-A

re no bar to the remedy, if "God's all-m

it seems

's-if so

h its mat

mitless,

nce on ev

I

makes itself evident.

nought

g itself

unchanged;

what go

l on eve

erie-A

h knowledge inevitably leads

han the pa

the pot

whelmed mi

e, the c

I

mistic conclusion borne in upon it by "resistless fact," the heart of man is made

urbidity a

own to the

be,' from eart

I

is no substantiating by knowledge the testimony of the heart; and man has no better anchorage for his optimism than faith. But the clos

When there

the home

nder, wo

range and ne

comes full

I

to counterpoise that of the mind; and which gives to "faith," or "hope," a fir

as yet examined. For, plain and irresistible as is the evidence of evil, so plain and constant is man's recognition of it as e

art is ma

nowhere by t

t-bad and good

human appr

hah-Ferisht

n of our intelligence,

e eye

purpose and

purpose for the supre

avails to onl

nce no man bu

g, needs m

I

ence, but is, spite of his consciousness of ignorance an

nothing, under

itiator-sp

o endow him,

better were

n see or fee

everywhere, but

supply,-one

re, which Man at

t power and

ncis F

ty to effect his benevolent purpose. "Things must take will for deed," as Browni

is it

such impuissance? W

Does which exalts him,

S

"service as perfect." The will was there, although it lacked power to effect itself. The moral worth of an action is complete, if it is willed; and it is nowise affected by its outer conseque

victory, the

! Be rewarded

act. In love s

no delusion

: apprehende

ze it

lar at S

man, his duty and his dignity in willing to perfor

n's

d love forth,-a

he has done

The

ther natural or moral, as something to be annulled, were it only possible-is an immediate proof of the indwelling of that which is hig

ong, as long as wrong seems wrong. The pessimist, in condemning the world, must except himself. In his very charge against God of having made man in His anger, there lies a contradi

d all it holds

eaching love and hat

onception new lif

proved a bubble glassin

's doings-God's wor

a Sa

chaos and infinite night, man is still not without God, if he loves. In virtue of his love, he

e bel

t with neither

hat he names no

mself he re

an might a

h in th

s, the title of being "Firs

prove the sole

mbine, whateve

the might or

und there, pu

rely higher

with neither

rent in the p

s beyond dea

obler midge fo

best and highes

th in th

retchedness, then man, in condemning the world, though without power to remove the least of its miseries, would be higher than God. But we have still to account for the possibility of man's assuming an attitude implied in the consciousness that, while he is without power, God is without pity, and in the despair which springs from his hate of evil. How comes it that human nature rises above its origin, and is able-nay, obliged-to cond

, his birth of

ace, no alien

evolt against all suffering, are man's own creation; or else God, who made man's heart to love, has

uch that break

of causes, incapable of changing the least part of the scheme of things which he condemns, and therefore muc

of man

s my hand, which

also from its

Bean-

love no less than his finite intellect and

tion to its sou

the single a

I

ends by bri

starting

ency, God's

top my

Bean-

ea of cause, one of the categories of the thought which Browning has aspersed. And it is a little difficult to show why, if we are constrained to doubt our thought, when by the aid of causality it establishes a connection between finite and

s invalid-then a new light is thrown upon the being who gave man this power to love. The "necessity," "the mere power," which alone could be discerned

es, but hea

ng's ackn

s outweigh

od is with

les but evi

erie-A

n against the wrongs in the world. The voice of the moral consciousness, approving the good, condemning evil, and striving to annul it, is the voice of God, and has, therefore, supreme authority. We do wrong, therefore, in thinking that it is the weakness of man which is matched against the

i' the world His

ve at issue s

a wrong is

pain, what see

th in th

d and the endless miseries of humanity. The source of this despair, namely, the recognition of evil and wrong, is just the Godhood in man. There is no way of accounting for the fact that "Man hates what is and loves what should be," except by "blending the quality of man

e permission of evil, even though it shou

hould any ev

flesh to ag

ll-mercy mate

mits He evil

ounted such? S

pain, with f

il in thought,

l? Then, wheref

hrab

we have seen, he regards as a progressive realization of an infinitely high ideal. The deman

e br

fear: as to-

dvance or re

-still throu

han-As

less or curse, in suc

weak an

he foolish, ri

like in a ne

I

ife, thinks Browning, than

speak? You d

le grew in my

would'st thou s

t smoulder,

t with a wealth

Rephan, thy pl

I

is a symbol of promotion. The peace of the state of nature ha

old age, youth'

the body,

y, satiate wea

of des

I

tions of the moral life, which is essentially progressive. They

n Inf

bove and bel

ike to attra

cent: by hate

re indeed t

ever-to mo

aspire yet

bject ai

han-As

e. "Type need antitype." The fact that goodness is best, and that goodness is not a stagnant state but a progress, a gradual realization, though never complete, of an infinite ideal, of the perfection of God by a finite being, necessarily implies the consci

wrong we

-still wrong must

rvice, prove men

of evil o

ncis F

all effort would, therefore, be futile. And, on the other hand, if evil were known as unreal, then there were no need of moral effort, no quarrel with the present and therefore no aspiration, and no achievement. That which is man's high

ral life as progressive

To speculative reason, however, it is impossible, as the poet believes, that evil should thus be at the same time regarded as both real and unreal. Knowledge leads to despair on every side; for, whether it takes the evil in the world as seeming or actual, it stultifies effort, and proves that moral progress, which is best of all things, is impossible. But the moral consc

tside, fact or

and what evil

or be fact t

ncis F

f learning goodness, this gradual realization by man of an ideal infinitely high and absolute in worth, throws back a light which illumines all the pain and strife and despair, and shows them all to be steps in the endless "love-way." The