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dly M

oying, for the first time, an International Commission of Enquiry, for the purpose of ascertaining the facts of the lamentable attack perpetrated by the Russian fleet upon British fishing vessels off the Dogger Bank, on October 21, 1905. The Commission sat from J

n"; (3) "International Commissions of Enquiry"; (4) Arbitration. All four were recommended by The Hague Convention of 1899 "For the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes" (by which, indeed, (2) and (3) were first suggested), as also by the amended re-issue of tha

to which reference is made in the concluding letters of this chapter), and, in particular, by the plan for the establishment of a "Permanent Court of

THE PRESIDENT OF

g waged in South Africa. From the New York World cablegram, it would appear that the President was requested to take this step "in accordance with Art. 3 of the protocol of the Peace Conference at The

ngères au conflit offrent de leur propre initiative, en tant que les circons

ation appartient aux Puissances étrangères au

re considéré par l'une ou l'autre des par

ggested by the present

convention is already in force, whereas it is [1899], in the case of most, if not all, of the Powers repr

ffer of good offices is a [003]useful and unobjectionable proceeding, in suitable cases (en tant que les circonstances s'y prêtent). It cannot

olony of the Cape was pleased, as is alleged, to follow the lead of the Presidents of t

edient

. HO

October

ly all civilised Powers ratified or acceded to it. It is now, for almost all Powers, superseded by The Hague Convention, No. i.

s about declined so to intervene. The President of the United States, however, in a note delivered in London on March 13, went so far as to "express an earnest hope that a way to bring about peace might be found," and to say that he would aid "in any friendly manner to bring about so happy a result." Lord S

ENQUIRY AND THE

es"[004] which deal with "international commissions of enquiry" should be clearly understood. It is probably also desirable that a more correct idea should be formed

uted questions of fact would be useful. This recommendation is, however, restricted to "controversies in which neither honour nor essentia

unimportant whether or no the scope of Art. 9 is enlarged by Art. 10. The entire liberty of the Powers to make any arrangement which may seem good to them for clearing up their differences is neither given, nor impaired, by the articles in question, to which the good sense of the Conference declined to attach any such obligatory force as had been proposed by Russia. It may well be that disputant

l at The Hague, to which, however, no Power is bound to resort. It resembles not so much a treaty as a collection of "pious wishes" (voeux), such as those which were also adopted at The Hague. The operative phrases of most usual occurrence in the convention are, ac

two contracting States." Such treaties, conforming as they all do to one carefully defined type, may be productive of much good. They testify to, and may promote, a very widely spread entente cordiale, they enhance the prestige of the tribunal of The Hague, and they assure the reference to that tribunal of certain classes of questions which might otherwise give rise to international complications. Beyond this it would surely be unwise to

your obedie

. HO

ovember 2

the Convention of 1899 "For the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes

e relating to the interpretation of treaties, are to be submitted to arbitration, unless they affect the vital interests, independence, or honour, of the States concerned, or the interests of third States; while all differences as to the interpretation of treaties relating to a scheduled list of topics, or as to the amount of damages payable, where liability to some extent is undisputed, are to be so submitted without any such reservation. This proposal was accepted by thirty-two Powers, but as nine Powers opposed it, an

which may arise between them, on condition "that they do not involve either the vital interests, or the independence, or honour of the two contracting States, and that they do not affect the interests of a third Power," has served as a mo

e three letter

GUE OF

induced myself, as, doubtless many others, to abstain from criticising the way in which the topic has been handled by the

ciety. Two matters so wholly incongruous in character should surely have been dealt with separately. Whether it is now too late to attempt a remedy for the consequences of this unfortunate combination is a question which can be answered only by the diplomatists whose business it is to be intimately in touch with the susceptibili

of a recital that universal peace "can be established only if it is based upon social justice," wholly occupied with a sufficiently

itted to the Powers for further consideration. (The opportunity might be taken of ridding it of all ref

attributing functions, for the most part of a temporary character, the "League of Nations," to substitute for any mention of the League words descrip

your obedie

. HO

ecember 1

that the Treaty of Peace could be relieved of articles relating exclusively to an as yet to be created Lea

s. He may have inferred so much from my letter of the 16th, in which, treating the question whether it is now too late to attempt a remedy for the existing state of things as beyond the competence

nisation might be annoyed if this were done. I am, however, confident that the organisation is too intelligent not to see that it would lose nothing if the articles in which it

your obedie

. HO

ecember 2

nd the powers of competent diplomatists." No such belief is expressed in my letter of December 16, in which I was careful to admit that the questi

your obedie

. HO

January

TIO

ic Re

case, was to explain the true nature of the species of reprisals known as "Pacific Blockade," and to point out the difference between the consequences of such a measure and those which result from a "Belligerent Blockade." A fifth letter, written with reference to t

KADE OF

be premature as yet to expect explicit information from the French Government; but there should not

net, if it has commenced a war without the sanction of the Chambers, has or has not thereby violated the French Constitution. If there is a war, and if the blockade, being effective, has been duly

merely putting upon her that form of pres

been enforced, by England as well as by France, upon several occasions, against the vessels of third Powers; but this practice has always been protested against, especially by French jurists, as an unwarrantable interference with the rights of such Powers, and was acknowledged by Lord Palmerston to [011]be illegal. The British Go

nal, which, at its meeting at Heidelberg in 1887, arrived at certain conclusions

e guerre ne doit être considere comme permis par l

n étranger peuvent entrer

éclaré et notifié officiellement, e

uvent être séquestrés. Le blocus ayant cessé, ils doivent être restitués avec

st they must be prepared, by becoming belligerent, to face the disadvantages wh

your obedie

. HO

lub, July

IC BL

ific blockade" is one of the various methods-generically described as "reprisals," such as "embargo," or seizure of ships on the high seas-by which, without resort to war, pressure, topographically or otherwise limited in extent, may be put upon an offending State. The need f

consideration, I read with amazement "M.'s" assertion that "the majority in number," "the most weighty in authority" of the writers on international law "have never failed to protest against such practices as indefensible in principle." The fact is that the objections made by, e.g. Lord Palmerston in 1846, and by several writers of textbooks, to pacific blockade, had reference to the abuses connected with the earlier stages of its development. As directed only against the ships of the "quasi-enemy," it has received the substantially unanimous approbation of the Institut de Droit International at Heidelberg in 1887, after a very interesting debate, in which the advo[013]cates of the practice were led by M. Perels, of the Prussian Admiralty, and its detractors by Professor Geffken. It is true that in

ecklessness of Greece was endangering the peace of the world; advice and threats had been proved to be useless; it was not till the material evidence of the blockade was afforded

your obedie

. HO

March

ZUELAN C

upt and in the throes of revolution, not a few questions of law and policy, as to which misunderstanding is more than probable, are raised from day to day by the action of the joint squadrons

ss the following advantages: They are strictly limited in scope; they cease, when their object has been attained, without the formalities of a treaty of peace; and, no condition of "belligerency" existing between the Powers immediately concerned, third Powers are not called upon to undertake the onerous obligations of "neutrality." The objection sometimes made to reprisals, that they are applicable only to the weaker Powers, since a strong Power would at once treat them as acts of w

ate authority, call for redress. Losses [015]by British subjects in the course of civil wars would come next, and would need more careful scrutiny (on this point the debates and votes of the Institut de Droit International, at its meeting at Neuchatel in 1900, may be consulted with advantage). Last of all would come the claims of unpaid bondholders, as to which Mr. Balfour would seem to endorse, in principle, the statement made in 1880 by Lord

the course of our controversy with Brazil in 1861. In modern practice, these measures imply a temporary sequestration, as opposed to confiscation or destruction, of the property taken. In the belief t

, unduly harsh, not only towards the peccant State, but also towards third States, [016]the ships of which were even confiscated for attempting to break a blockade of this nature. Two views on this subject are now entertained-viz. (1) that the ships of third Powers breaking a pacific blockade may be turned back with any needful exertion of force, and, if need be, temporarily detained; (2) that they may not be interfered with. The former view is apparently that of the German Government. It was certainly

tion is changed in two respects: (1) the hostilities which may be carried on by the allies are no longer localised, or otherwise limited, except by the dictates of humanity; (2) third States become ipso facto "neutrals," and, as such, subject to obligations to which up

is to be done must obviously be arranged by previous agreement. More especially would this be requisite where, as in the case of Great

cate questions may obviously arise between the creditors who have and those who have not taken active steps to make their claims effective. In the present instance, France is said to assert that she has acquired a sort of prior mortgage on the assets of Venezuela; and the

ernment can only be supposed to extend to it so far as it is reasonably defined and applied. Great Britain, for one, has no desire for an acre of new territory on the American continent. The United States, on the other hand, will doubtless readily recognise t

your obedie

. HO

ecember 1

0

EZUELA

f the so-called "protocol" of February 18 seems, however, to point a moral which one may hope will not be lost sight of in the future-viz.

operation the dormant powers of the Supreme Court of the island as a prize Court, &c.-one would have suppo

is curious to find that the article (7) of the protocol which effects this desirable result begins by a recital to the effect that "it may be contended that

know, and that other nations should at least have the mean

your obedie

. HO

ebruary 1

ND RE

to a topic upon which I addressed you when, six years ago, our own Government was similarly engaged in putting pressure upon Venezuela-viz. the desirability of drawi

it will be observed, exclusively such as must not commence without either a "declaration of war," or "an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war"; and Art. 2 requires that the "state of war" thus created shall be notified to "neutral Po

ally, an indeterminate list of unfriendly acts, such as embargo, pacific blockade, seizure of custom-houses, and even occupation of territory, to which resort is had in order to obtain redress from an offending State without going to war with it. The pressure thus ex

for consideration would see

ercising pressure short of war?-I think not. States differ so widely in offensive power and vulnerability that it wo

t which they are exercised that they are reprisals and not operations of war?-This would seem to be highly desirable; unless inde

would, doubtless, be convenient, unless the non-receipt by them of any notification of a "state o

s as now practised, I may perhaps refer to an article in t

your obedie

. HO

ecember 2

ernment of the United States, which asserts that "public indebtedness cannot justify armed intervention by a European Power, much less material occupation by it of territory belonging to any American nation." The reply of the United States declined to carry the "Monroe doctrin

of contractual debts, claimed from the Government of a country by the Government of another country, as being due to its subjects. This stipulation shall have no application when the debtor State declines, or leav